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Sunday, April 17, 2016

SOUTH AFRICA LETS BIG BROTHER SPY ON YOU PROOF!!


https://wikileaks.org/spyfiles4/customers.html

PROOF !!



Today, 15 September 2014, WikiLeaks releases previously unseen copies of weaponised German surveillance malware used by intelligence agencies around the world to spy on journalists, political dissidents and others.

FinFisher (formerly part of the UK based Gamma Group International until late 2013) is a German company that produces and sells computer intrusion systems, software exploits and remote monitoring systems that are capable of intercepting communications and data from OS X, Windows and Linux computers as well as Android, iOS, BlackBerry, Symbian and Windows Mobile devices. FinFisher first came to public attention in December 2011 when WikiLeaks published documents detailing their products and business in the first SpyFiles release.

Since the first SpyFiles release, researchers published reports that identified the presence of FinFisher products in countries around the world and documented its use against journalists, activists and political dissidents.

Julian Assange, WikiLeaks Editor in Chief said: "FinFisher continues to operate brazenly from Germany selling weaponized surveillance malware to some of the most abusive regimes in the world. The Merkel government pretends to be concerned about privacy, but its actions speak otherwise. Why does the Merkel government continue to protect FinFisher?

This full data release will help the technical community build tools to protect people from FinFisher including by tracking down its command and control centers."

FinFisher Relay and FinSpy Proxy are the components of the FinFisher suite responsible for collecting the data acquired from the infected victims and delivering it to their controllers. It is commonly deployed by FinFisher's customers in strategic points around the world to route the collected data through an anonymizing chain, in order to disguise the identity of its operators and the real location of the final storage, which is instead operated by the FinSpy Master.



WikiLeaks is also publishing previously unreleased copies of the FinFisher FinSpy PC spyware for Windows. This software is designed to be covertly installed on a Windows computer and silently intercept files and communications, such as Skype calls, emails, video and audio through the webcam and microphone
(you can find more details on FinSpy in the first SpyFiles release).


DISCLAIMER : In order to prevent any accidental execution and infection, the following files have been renamed and compressed in password protected archives (the password is "infected").
They are weaponised malware, so handle carefully.


In order to challenge the secrecy and the lack of accountability of the surveillance industry, analyzing the internals of this software could allow security and privacy researchers to develop new fingerprints and detection techniques, identify more countries currently using the FinFisher spyware and uncover human rights abuses.



In addition, in this fourth iteration of the SpyFiles collection, WikiLeaks publishes the newly indexed material the same as the recent FinFisher breach (for which you can find the torrent file here), including new brochures and a database of the customer support website, that provide updated details on their productline and a unique insight into the company's customer-base.

In order to make the data more easily accessible and consumable, all the new brochures, videos and manuals are now available organized under the related FinFisher product name. The database is represented in full, from which WikiLeaks compiled a list of customers, their eventual attribution, all the associated support tickets and acquired licenses, along with the estimated costs calculated from FinFisher's price list.


WikiLeaks conservatively estimates FinFisher's revenue from these sales to amount to around €50,000,000. Within the full list of customers, it's worth noticing that among the largest is Mongolia, which has been recently selected as new Chair of the Freedom Online Coalition.

Together with the previous releases, the SpyFiles collection represents a unique and central resource where to find extensive and exclusive documentation about the global surveillance industry, also indexed and searchable through the WikiLeaks Search.

FINSPY
This is how it works

video

FinFisher - Customers


Through FinFisher's support and feedback platform, customers could provide feedback, open support request and obtain updates to the products they acquired.

The majority of customers are just identified by a 8 digits long alphanumeric username, the few recognizable usernames revealed names of third companies such as Cobham Surveillance GmbH in Germany, Dyplex Communications Ltd in Canada, Elaman GmbH in Germany and Trovicor GmbH in Germany. It's important to notice that none of them have product licenses associated with them, meaning they might be distribution partners, rather than actual customers.

Some customers were identified through the analysis of support requests and attached documents they provided to FinFisher support. This included Slovakia, Mongolia, Qatar State Security, South Africa, Bahrain, Pakistan, Estonia, Vietnam, Australia NSW Police, Belgium, Nigeria, Netherlands KLPD, PCS Security in Singapore, Bangladesh, Secret Services of Hungary, Italy and Bosnia & Herzegovina Intelligence.

Provided with the price list, we calculated an estimation of the profit FinFisher generated through the sale of surveillance products licenses. Applying the retail price to all the licenses available in the database, they amount to a total of €47,550,196, or €98,362,554 if we consider all the licenses marked as "deleted" too.
Consider that the FinFly ISP licenses were not taken into account as no price was provided, and that support and training costs were not included in this estimation. Therefore we could realistically expect a higher number.

In the following table you can browse through each customer record, read their support requests, see the licenses they acquired, whether they are customers at the time of this publication and an estimation of how much money was invested in the acquisition of such licenses.




E7549C72 South Africa 23

Licenses

Software Start Expiration Estimated Cost Deleted
FinSpy 2009-09-02 00:00:00 2011-09-03 00:00:00 Base license + 100 targets + 3 agents
€526200
Yes
FinFly USB 2009-09-02 00:00:00 2011-09-03 00:00:00 €4620Yes
FinFly LAN 2009-09-10 00:00:00 2011-09-14 00:00:00 €32580Yes
FinUSB Suite 2010-06-22 00:00:00 2011-06-30 00:00:00 €13080Yes
FinFly LAN 2009-09-10 00:00:00 2011-09-14 00:00:00 €32580Yes
FinUSB Suite 2010-06-22 00:00:00 2011-06-30 00:00:00 €13080Yes
FinUSB Suite 2010-06-22 02:00:00 2013-01-11 01:00:00 €13080Yes
FinUSB Suite 2010-06-22 02:00:00 2013-01-11 01:00:00 €13080Yes
FinSpy 2009-09-02 02:00:00 2013-01-11 01:00:00 Base license + 100 targets + 3 agents
€526200
Yes
FinFly USB 2009-09-02 02:00:00 2013-01-11 01:00:00 €4620Yes
FinFly LAN 2009-09-10 02:00:00 2013-01-11 01:00:00 €32580Yes
FinIntrusion Kit 2012-03-17 01:00:00 2013-03-18 01:00:00 €30600Yes
FinIntrusion Kit 2012-03-17 01:00:00 2013-03-18 01:00:00 €30600Yes
FinFly LAN 2012-03-17 01:00:00 2013-03-18 01:00:00 €32580Yes
FinFly LAN 2012-03-17 01:00:00 2013-03-18 01:00:00 €32580Yes
FinIntrusion Kit 2012-03-17 01:00:00 2014-04-29 02:00:00 €30600
FinIntrusion Kit 2012-03-17 01:00:00 2014-04-29 02:00:00 €30600
FinFly USB 2009-09-02 02:00:00 2014-04-29 02:00:00 €4620
FinSpy 2009-09-02 02:00:00 2014-04-29 02:00:00 Base license + 100 targets + 3 agents
€526200
FinUSB Suite 2010-06-22 02:00:00 2014-04-29 02:00:00 €13080
FinUSB Suite 2010-06-22 02:00:00 2014-04-29 02:00:00 €13080
FinFly LAN 2012-03-17 01:00:00 2014-04-29 02:00:00 €32580
FinFly LAN 2012-03-17 01:00:00 2014-04-29 02:00:00 €32580
Total: €683340 (€2021400)

Feedback

First Name Subject Description
E7549C72 FinSpy Mobile To whom it may concern

We are currently investigating the possibility of adding the FinSpy Mobile package to our cyber solution.

Brydon was always our contact person and he was in contact with our general manager, but he was moved to another structure. Can you please ask him to prepare a proposal and forward it to cyberiakicksass@gmail.com.

Regards
ZAR
ZAR Screensaver infection Hi,

In previous versions of Finspy, it was possible to embed the trojan into screensaver and the extension remains .scr. With V4.2 it changes the extension to .exe, any particular reason why this occurs.

Regards
ZAR FINSPY mobile Hi Sales,

We are considering purchasing the FinSpy Mobile Package.

Will you please supply us with a quotation as soon as possible.

We also had a demo a while ago, but you can supply us with the road map only.

Regards

Support Requests

Summary Product Description Attachment
Unable to update to 3.6 and wrong Machine ID with the licence key FinUSB Suite After I successfully imported the new licence it extended the validity period, but it does not upgrade to v3.6. It says there is no internet connection, but I am sure there is.

The licence key and the machine id does not match. See attached screenshot

Regards
ZAR
cyberiakicksass@gmail.com
18E1639C.docx
29 DDCD64A2 Bahrain 7
30 0DBB5B36 7
31 0988BAEB 15 Yes
32 0DF6972B Pakistan 3
34 Dyplex1 0
35 DE8E0FCE 6
36 9145EC2C 5 Yes
37 73DAAD57 5
40 9772CC62 25 Yes
41 979A48A0 2
42 134918DA 44
43 B58616D2 6
44 D5D58215 8 Yes
45 AFE2D27D 4 Yes
46 54F83B4E 14 Yes
47 14ED6D84 Estonia 37 Yes
48 BEC8B100 Vietnam 3
49 88F3D306 Australia NSW Police 9 Yes
50 86BECF61 6 Yes
51 DBB3DED7 3
52 76026992 23 Yes
53 59763BFA 33 Yes
54 C5093EE3 3
55 3FED1144 5 Yes
56 49378CEF 8 Yes
57 CC1AC4B8 5
58 89EC5BB5 12 Yes
59 62CF12AD 9
60 3DF77708 2
61 70CD6D97 Belgium 13
62 79E95D1D 2
63 663F8B4D 3 Yes
64 1E198336 2 Yes
65 F9660CE4 Nigeria 6
66 CF770EB3 1 Yes
67 0917680A 9 Yes
68 20FEC907 Netherlands KLPD 16 Yes
69 B206FF8C Singapore PCS Security 19 Yes
70 82990EA6 6 Yes
71 6B9EDD58 Bangladesh 6 Yes
72 79A22210 3
73 0012A3F0 Hungary SSNS 5 Yes
74 36666677 11 Yes
75 7656ED4D 1
76 DA93FA7D 1
78 FB0C602B 12 Yes
79 22F984B0 5 Yes
80 EDD0F89C 1 Yes
81 7306871B Italy 4 Yes
82 7F425F82 Bosnia Herzegovina Intelligence 3 Yes
83 43A301F9 7 Yes
84 151D22D0 6 Yes
85 80C618D4 Italy 3
86 026B8822 10 Yes
87 C6FEB248 3 Yes
88 CC57BE53 18 Yes
89 2A167AC6 5 Yes
90 F547C8AC 3 Yes
91 F90ACE17 15 Yes
92 Geoff1 1
93 180018D8 7 Yes
94 613780C4 1 Yes
95 6B5CC6A2 1 Yes
96 FCFE2B79 6 Yes
97 C1D31255 7 Yes
98 72EDF7D3 2 Yes
99 78D08C85 10 Yes
100 DAF42FBC 8 Yes



Dark Measure : Biotech LEAKED and this is only the Beginning


Desperate Measures

Desperate Measure
The Biotech Industry Organization (BIO) changed its name awhile back, to the Biotech Innovation Organization—so we’d like them better.
But we prefer to just call them desperate.
According to the Des Moines Register, biotech crops were planted on fewer acres around the world in 2015—the first decline in 20 years. Meanwhile, Monsanto’s profits are tanking. And Washington State is suing the Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA) for $14 million over a money-laundering scheme the GMA used to help defeat a GMO labeling ballot initiative in the state, in 2015.
Yes, the biotech and Big Food industries are hurting. But they aren’t giving up, at least not yet.
This week, BIO staged a fly-in in Washington D.C. in yet another desperate attempt to get enough votes to pass a federal bill to prevent states like Vermont from requiring labels on GMO foods and ingredients. And Sen. Pat Roberts (R-Kan.), sponsor of that bill (which we call the DARK Act) is still out there swinging for the team. Last week, Roberts told AgriTalk (here’s the link, if you can bear to listen to it) that “The farmer doesn’t plant the seed in the ground if he doesn’t expect to see the crop.” Which was Roberts’ folksy way of sayin’ that he wouldn’t have proposed his bill to kill GMO labeling if he didn’t expect to win.
So far, Roberts hasn’t won. But he’s made it clear he’s still trying to get enough votes in time to stop Vermont’s GMO labeling law from taking effect on July 1.
We need to be equally clear—and equally persistent. 
TAKE ACTION: Tell your Senators: No compromise! Protect Vermont’s GMO labeling law.

Dial 888-897-0174 to tell your Senators to vote against any compromise that would block or delay Vermont's bill from taking effect.

Help us protect Vermont’s GMO labeling law

BIOTECH AND MONSANTO
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SEEK EMPOWERMENT IN BIOTECH FROM
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
see the following article curtesy WikiLeaks

Conspiracy on our Shelves : “Better Living Through Chemistry”

Curtesy Article Referral site


Conspiracy on our Shelves : “Better Living Through Chemistry”

Curtesy Article Referral site